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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE
Charles E.M. Kolb and Christopher Dreibelbis+
America now enjoys the distinction of being the world's sole super-
power as well as the world's greatest participatory democracy. Although
our reputation as a superpower is beyond question, our practice is some-
what open to doubt when it comes to democracy. These doubts are fos-
tered by a significant decline in voter turnout in recent years, not only for
the off-year congressional elections, but also for the four-year presiden-
tial election cycles.1
I. WHY CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM MATTERS
Although there is no directly established correlation between voter
participation and campaign financing, recent surveys strongly suggest
that one of the key reasons why people are choosing not to vote is be-
cause of their disgust with the current system of campaign finance.2 The
2000 presidential election cycle provides the latest terrain on which the
effort to reform our campaign finance system is being played.3 Both
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1. See Federal Election Commission, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections:
1960-1996 (visited Aug. 29, 2000) <http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm>.
2. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Secretaries of State, New Millennium Project Part I:
America Youth Attitudes on Politics, Citizenship, Government and Voting (visited Aug. 31,
2000)<http://www.tarrance.com/nass/default.asp?strTite=nass%20new2%2Omillenium%2
OProject>. The Tarrance Group, Inc. and Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates conducted this
survey during November 14-19, 1998. See id. The survey questioned 1,005 youth (ages 15-
24) and asked voting-age survey respondents "for their opinion of why many young people
do not vote." Id. The plurality of respondents said it was because "they don't think their
vote makes a difference." Id. In the same survey, 64% of all respondents agreed that
"'government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, not for the benefit
of all."' Id.
3. See Anthony Corrado, Introduction to Money and Politics: A History of Federal
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major party candidates have advanced their own reform ideas against a
backdrop of bipartisan abuse of the campaign finance laws during the
1996 presidential campaign.4
Public opinion polls, however, tend to list campaign finance reform at
or near the bottom of issues about which the public cares When people
are asked whether they believe our campaign finance system is broken,
however, a large majority of those asked answer affirmatively. 6 Likewise,
a spring 2000 survey by News Hour with Jim Lehrer of some 18,976 view-
ers found campaign finance reform heading the list of important election
issues.7 The second most important issue was health care, which 7.9% of
Campaign Finance Law, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 25, 27-35
(Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997) and Daniel R. Ortiz, Introduction to The First
Amendment at Work: Constitutional Restrictions on Campaign Finance Regulation, in
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 61, 63-66 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,
1997) for a history of the laws and cases that have shaped the campaign finance system.
4. See Bush-Cheney 2000, Campaign Finance Reform (visited Aug. 17, 2000)
<http://www.georgewbush...-l&bhab=-l&FormMode=FullText&lD=35> for Republican
presidential nominee, Texas Governor George W. Bush's proposal to ban "soft" money
donations from corporations and labor unions, but not individuals. Governor Bush also
supports raising individual contribution limits and instant disclosure of contributions. See
id. See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore Proposing Endowment Fund To Pay for Political
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at Al for a report on Democratic nominee, Vice
President Al Gore's proposal to pass the McCain-Feingold legislation and then establish
an endowment to fund campaigns. Contributions from individuals, labor unions, corpora-
tions, and other sources would fund the endowment. See id. The money from the en-
dowment would go to House and Senate candidates in general elections who promise not
to accept money from other sources. See id. Gore also relies on broadcasters' donations
of free air time to campaigns. See id. For examples of abuses during the 1996 campaign,
see S. REP. NO. 105-167, at 31-50 reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4557-9506 (1998). See
also Roberto Suro, Audits Fault Clinton, Dole on '96 Party Ads, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
1998, at Al (discussing the use of illegally raised funds by both the Clinton and Dole cam-
paigns); Roberto Suro & John F. Harris, Reno is Now Probing Clinton's Fund-Raising,
WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1997, at Al (reporting on Attorney General Janet Reno's decision
to investigate allegations of illegal use of White House telephones for fundraising during
President Clinton's 1996 campaign); Bob Woodward, Gore Was 'Solicitor-in-Chief in '96
Reelection Campaign, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1997, at Al (reporting on Vice President Al
Gore's role in soliciting millions of dollars in campaign contributions).
5. See Fox News/Opinion Dynamics (visited Aug. 14, 2000)
<http://www.nationaljournal.com/scripts/printpage.cgi?/members/polltrack/200.. ./00mosti
mportant.ht> [hereinafter Fox News]. Opinion Dynamics conducted the poll on July 19-
20, 2000 and found that one percent of those asked to name the most important issue that
the federal government should address chose campaign finance reform.
6. See, e.g., Celinda Lake, Polls Say Public Has Prescription for Reform, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 23, 1998.
7. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: A Look at the Agenda (PBS Television broadcast,
Jan. 4, 2000) (summarizing a number of responses received from viewers and guests from
June to December 1999 on what the 2000 Presidential campaign should focus). Of the
18,976 responses, the following results indicate the percentage of those believing an issue
to be most important: Campaign Finance - 11.8%, Health Care - 7.9%, Education - 7.7%,
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the respondents selected.8
How does one explain these two apparently contradictory surveys?
One explanation is fairly simple: most Americans care more about the
issues that touch them and their families directly. Accordingly, issues
such as health care, education, crime, and the environment are typically
mentioned as top priorities.9
Moreover, most Americans do not contribute to political campaigns.
They have other priorities for their money, such as saving for a home,
college education, a new car, or even a vacation. In fact, fewer than one
percent of Americans make political contributions.'0 Those who do not
contribute may well conclude that they have no stake in the American
political system, especially when they see or read about thousands of "big
money" donors making six-figure contributions to the two main political
parties. Some of those who choose not to give and not to vote draw a
logical, albeit cynical, conclusion: We don't give, and nobody listens to
us. Why should we bother to vote?"
Likewise, many people are increasingly concerned about the role
played by special interests in politics and government.'2 More often than
not, these special interests are seen as the American business commu-
nity-the main providers of unregulated "soft" money contributions to
state and national political parties."
Foreign Policy - 7.6%, Poverty/Wage Gap - 5.9%, Leadership - 5.4%, Budget/Debt -
5.2%, Environment - 5.0%, Role of Government - 4.3%, Entitlements - 4.1%. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Fox News, supra note 5. Respondents named education (24%), health care
(23%), social security (20%), and taxes (17%) as the top issues the federal government
should address. See id.
10. See Center for Responsive Politics, Money in Politics Reform: Principles, Prob-
lems, and Proposals (visited Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/reform/ re-
formindex.htm>. "[Olne-third of 1 percent [of Americans] gave direct individual contri-
butions of $200 or more to congressional candidates in" the 1991-1992 election cycle. Id.
11. See generally David S. Broder, A Skeptical Electorate in Search of Leadership,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at Al.
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT
WENT WRONG AND WHY 61-85 (1999).
13. "Hard" money refers to campaign contributions that are subject to the limits and
restrictions of federal law. See generally Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994). Under the law, individuals and political action committees
(PACs) are allowed to contribute directly to political campaigns for federal office with
limits to how much each can give. See generally id. Individuals are allowed to donate
$1000 per candidate per election (primary and general elections count as separate elec-
tions) with an aggregate limit of $25,000 that each individual can give to candidates, PACs,
and parties in a given calendar year. See id. § 441a(a). PACs are allowed to contribute
$5000 per candidate per election with no aggregate limit. See id. Individuals are allowed
to contribute up to $5000 per calendar year to PACs. See id.
"Soft" money refers to funds donated to political parties and their affiliates, which fall
20001
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II. THE ROLE OF AMERICAN BUSINESS: FUNDER OF THE SYSTEM OR
CATALYST FOR REFORM?
It is in this context-and mindful of the scandals emanating from the
1996 presidential election cycle-that the Trustees of the Committee for
Economic Development (CED) decided in 1997 to study America's sys-
tem of campaign financing. 14 Founded in 1942, CED is a business-led re-
search and policy organization that includes more than 200 senior corpo-
rate executives and university presidents. The CED mission is "to
propose policies that bring about steady economic growth at high em-
ployment and reasonably stable prices, increased productivity and living
standards, greater and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all."' 5 Those Trustees who wanted CED to
address campaign finance reform did so because they believed that a po-
litical system that was financed in a manner that many considered to be
corrupt, or corrupting, undermined America's democratic institutions
and hurt the business community-and ultimately our economy in the
16process.
CED's Program Committee authorized the campaign finance reform
study in November 1997. A subcommittee was then established by
outside the limits and restrictions imposed by federal law. Corporations, labor unions, in-
terest groups, and foreign interests that cannot contribute directly to candidates under
FECA can all contribute unlimited amounts of money to party organizations. See FEC
Advisory Opinion, 1978-10 (Part A) (Aug. 29, 1978). Individuals can also contribute un-
limited amounts of money to parties. Party committees raising and spending "soft" money
must, however, disclose contributions and disbursements. See, e.g., Federal Elections, 11
C.F.R. §§ 104.8(e)-(f), 104.9(c)-(d) (2000). FECA severely limits party committees from
directly aiding candidates for office, but parties are allowed to spend unlimited funds for
party-building activities such as voter-registration, get-out-the vote drives, brochures, but-
tons, bumper stickers, and other related materials and activities. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B).
14. CED was founded in 1942 by the late Paul Hoffman for the express purpose of
devising strategies to avoid economic recession after World War II. CED is an independ-
ent research and policy organization, and its more than 200 Trustees determine the issues
the organization will address. These Trustees then work in subcommittees assisted by pro-
fessional staff and outside experts to prepare policy statements, which include findings and
recommendations on domestic as well as international issues. CED's Research and Policy
Committee has the responsibility for approving CED policy statements prepared by the
various subcommittees. Subjects are initially decided upon by the Program Committee,
which is a subset of the Research and Policy Committee.
15. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE'S
BUSINESS: A BUSINESS PROPOSAL FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM iv (1999) [herein-
after CED REPORT].
16. For example, see Letter from Edward B. Fitzgerald, Managing Director, Wood-
mont Associates, to Sol Hurwitz, then President of CED (Oct. 25, 1996) (on file with
author). In the letter urging CED to study campaign finance reform, Mr. Fitzgerald
writes, "the current political campaign certainly makes it apparent to me that our cam-
paign finance practices are out of control and are not well serving our nation." Id.
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CED's president who asked two CED Trustees, Edward Kangas, Global
Chairman of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and George Rupp, President of
Columbia University, to co-chair the study.17 After a nearly yearlong
study, CED's campaign finance reform subcommittee recommended a
comprehensive set of reforms to address the problems it identified in the
current campaign finance scheme." In doing so, these business and uni-
versity leaders reflected upon their own experience with the existing sys-
tem, and in the case of some of the business leaders involved, noted that
they had been pressured repeatedly by both political parties to contrib-
ute both hard and soft dollars to individual campaigns and the parties.
Some of them had clearly had enough and were willing to say so publicly.
As Edward Kangas explained when the CED report was released on
March 18, 1999, "'[a] government which is overly susceptible to money
will be viewed at the least as suspect, and at the worst as corrupt. Bad
government is bad for business."' "9
CED's report both raised eyebrows and irritated some important poli-
ticians. When CNN covered the CED report in its March 18, 1999 edi-
tion of AllPolitics.com, the lead-in to the story announced the episode as
a "man bites a dog" story.2 Here was a group of business leaders calling
the campaign finance system "broken" when, after all, it was the larger
business community that for the most part funded that same system.
What was going on here?
17. The members of the CED Subcommittee on Campaign Finance Reform are: Ed-
ward A. Kangas, Global Chairman, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Co-Chair; George Rupp,
President, Columbia University, Co-Chair; Alan Belzer, Retired President & COO,
AlliedSignal Inc.; John Brademas, President Emeritus, New York University; John B.
Cave, Principal, Avenir Group, Inc.; W. D. Eberle, Chairman, Manchester Associates,
Ltd.; Patricia O'Donnell Ewers, Former President, Pace University; Edmund B. Fitz-
gerald, Managing Director, Woodmont Associates; Rosemarie Greco, Principal, Greco
Ventures; William F. Hecht, Chairman, President & CEO, PP&L Resources, Inc.; Robert
J. Hurst, Vice Chairman, Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Eamon M. Kelly, Retired President,
Tulane University; Thomas J. Klutznick, President, Thomas J. Klutznick Co.; Victor A.
Pelson, Senior Advisor, Warburg Dillon Read Inc.; Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, The
Blackstone Group; Ned Regan, President-designate, Baruch College; E.B. Robinson, Jr.,
Chairman Emeritus, Deposit Guaranty Corp.; Daniel Rose, Chairman, Rose Associates,
Inc.; Howard Rosencrantz; Chief Executive Officer, Grey Flannel Auctions; Rocco Sicil-
iano; Stephen Stamas, Chairman, The American Assembly; Paula Stern, President, The
Stern Group; James A. Thomson, President & CEO, RAND; Anthony Corrado, Associ-
ate Professor of Government, Colby College, Project Director; Michael S. Berman, Presi-
dent, The Duberstein Group, Inc., Advisor; Kenneth Gross, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, Advisor; Trevor Potter, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Advisor.
18. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 4-6.
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III. CED's REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CED's report and its recommendations are contained in a policy
statement entitled, Investing in the People's Business: A Business Pro-
posal for Campaign Finance Reform.2' The report contains a discussion
of how the current campaign finance system works, the problems noted
with that system, and a series of recommendations that are intended to
be taken as a comprehensive package of reform.
The report's opening paragraph makes clear in no uncertain terms the
fundamental perspective of the CED Trustees who prepared and en-
dorsed the document:
The American public believes that our campaign finance system
is broken. The vast majority of citizens feel that money threat-
ens the basic fairness and integrity of our political system. Two
out of three Americans think that money has an "excessive in-
fluence" on elections and government policy. Substantial ma-
jorities in poll after poll agree that "Congress is largely owned
by the special interest groups," or that special interests have
"too much influence over elected officials." Fully two-thirds of
the public think that "their own representative in Congress
would listen to the views of outsiders who made large political
contributions before a constituent's views."22
While the report details the concerns about this campaign finance system
for the public at large and our democracy in particular, it also lays out
frankly the worries that the CED Trustees have as "business leaders":
As business leaders, we are also concerned about the effects of
the campaign finance system on the economy and business.
Americans identify "special interests" principally with corpora-
tions. A vibrant economy and well functioning business system
will not remain viable in an environment of real or perceived
corruption, which will corrode confidence in government and
business. If public policy decisions are made-or appear to be
made-on the basis of political contributions, not only will pol-
icy be suspect, but its uncertain and arbitrary character will
make business planning less effective and the economy less
productive. In addition, the pressures on businesses to contrib-
ute to campaigns because their competitors do so will increase.
We wish to compete in the marketplace, not in the political
23
arena.
21. CED REPORT, supra note 15.
22. Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id.
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Notable in its approach, the CED report does not say that money in
politics is bad for the country or the economy. The concern is over how
those dollars-particularly the unregulated "soft" dollars that go to the
political parties-are raised. This distinction is an important one to bear
in mind, and it is a point which often distinguishes the CED recommen-
dations from those advanced by others in the reform community who
would prefer to replace the current system with complete public financ-
ing of political campaigns." The CED subcommittee considered-and
explicitly rejected-total public financing.
The CED policy recommendations are based on four important find-
ings or problems with the current financing system. In CED's view, these
problems-if left unaddressed-challenge and undermine the "basic
principles of democratic government."25
1. Money and fundraising have become too important and demanding
in American political life. The pressure on incumbents, and especially
challengers, to raise money is enormous, especially given rising campaign
costs. The average candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives
spends over $500,000 campaigning, and the average U.S. Senate con-
tender spends almost $3.8 million.26 Because "hard" dollar campaign
limits restrict contributions from individuals to not more than $1000 per
election cycle, candidates must spend considerable time raising the funds
needed to wage effective campaigns.
2. The high cost of campaigns and the burdens of fundraising have re-
duced competition and the pool of qualified candidates in federal elec-
tions. One result of this situation is the growing importance of personal
wealth to finance a campaign.27 Incumbents often use the power of in-
cumbency to amass sizeable campaign war chests to discourage challeng-
ers from their own, as well as other parties.8 Consequently, the cam-
24. For an example, see Public Campaign, Clean Money Clean Elections (visited Oct.
22, 2000) <http://www.publiccampaign.org/clean-main.html>.
25. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
26. Id. at 2.
27. See Mike Allen, Multimillionaire Beats Ex-Governor for Senate Nod, WASH.
POST, June 7, 2000, at A6. Former Goldman Sachs Chairman Jon Corzine recently broke
the spending record in a U.S. Senate campaign for a seat from New Jersey by spending $34
million of his own money in the primary alone. See id. The previous record was set by
Michael Huffington of California, who spent $30 million of his own money in a run for the
U.S. Senate. See id.
28. See Federal Election Commission, Twenty Year Report (visited Sept. 6, 2000)
<http://www.fec.gov/pages/20yearl.htm> [hereinafter FEC, Twenty Year Report]. "Most
of [the incumbents'] money went to create what one critic calls a 'gold-plated permanent
political machine'-a well-funded campaign organization used to discourage challengers
from entering the race." Id. (discussing the 1990 congressional elections).
2000]
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paigns of challengers-particularly in the House-are often under-
funded.29 With relatively less or weak competition facing incumbents,
voter choice is significantly diminished.
For incumbents, this situation ensures a low probability of being de-
feated. Since 1976, the reelection rate of incumbent members of the U.S.
House of Representatives varied between 74.7% and 92.4%. 3o If the out-
come is therefore unlikely to change, it is not unreasonable for potential
voters to become apathetic and cynical about the value of their participa-
tion in our election process.
3. The role of the small donor has declined. Rather than appeal to large
numbers of people for smaller contributions, both incumbents and chal-
lengers respond to the obvious incentives created by the current rules: it
is simply more cost-effective for them to concentrate their efforts on
raising larger sums from fewer individuals.3' In 1998, 68% of the funds
that congressional candidates received from individual donors came in
contributions of $500 or more.32 This figure was far higher than the 41%
some fourteen years earlier.33
Additionally, this process encouraged candidates to rely more on PAC
contributions than in the past.34 Although subject to limits on both the
amounts able to be contributed and spent,35 PAC money comes from in-
29. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 17-1.8 ("Incumbents normally enjoy a very
large advantage in campaign fundraising and are therefore capable, in most instances, of
outspending their opponents by substantial margins.").
30. See NORMAN ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1997-1998, at
61 (1998).
31. See DREW, supra note 12, at 65 (quoting Washington lobbyist Robin Wexler on
the emergence of PACs and their influence over legislators as saying that: "This whole
thing blew apart in the eighties, when congressmen could raise all this money. Before,
they'd attend twenty-five-dollar barbeques.").
32. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-15.
33. Id.
34. See Frank J. Sorauf, Introduction to Political Action Committees, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 123 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). PACs es-
sentially bundle voluntary individual donations into a single fund in order to support the
interests of the sponsoring organization through political contributions. See id. Typically
associated with the business community and special interest groups, the first PAC was
founded by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1943 in response to Con-
gress's ban on direct contributions from labor unions to campaigns. See id. PACs have
seen their numbers rise and their political clout skyrocket since FECA's passage in 1974.
See id. The legitimacy the legislation afforded PACs and the generous limits set on con-
tributions, along with the parallel explosion of special interest groups, made PACs quite
attractive in the 1970s and 1980s. See id. From 1978 to 1996, PAC contributions to con-
gressional candidates rose almost six-fold. See id.
35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing limits on PAC contribu-
tions).
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dividuals (as distinguished from unlimited "soft" money that comes from
individuals, corporate treasuries, or union treasuries) and is typically
seen as money from "special interests" seeking to buy or ensure access to
a lawmaker."
4. Unregulated funds raised and spent in federal elections have increased
dramatically. Perhaps CED's principal concern was the growth of party
"soft" money financing and candidate-specific "issue advertising." If
"soft" money were, in fact, used as was originally intended in the 1974
campaign finance legislation, today's concerns most likely would not ex-
ist. What has occurred, beginning in the mid-1980s and mushrooming in
the 1990s and 2000, is an enormous growth in unlimited "soft" money
contributions.37 These dollars go directly to the political parties, ostensi-
bly to fund party organizing efforts such as get-out-the-vote drives or
general advertising about the parties. Instead, through exercising a
loophole in the law, individuals, corporations, and labor unions avoid the
"hard dollar" limits on individual donations and circumvent the laws that
prevent corporations and labor unions from giving to political candi-
dates.38
Now, "soft" money dollars are being used by the political parties to
fund what amounts to candidate-specific advertising that is nonetheless
characterized as otherwise legitimate issue advertising. This loophole is
the result of the unintended consequences of the 1974 law and the subse-
quent decision by the United States Supreme Court in the 1976 case,
Buckley v. Valeo. 9 Under Buckley's so-called "magic words" test, as
long as a campaign ad refrains from urging someone expressly to vote for
or vote against a particular candidate, the ad is not covered by the fed-
36. See FEC, Twenty Year Report, supra note 28, at 3.
37. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 3. CED's Vice President for Government Rela-
tions and Business Policy, Michael J. Petro, previously served as a fundraiser for the
Democratic National Committee and several Democratic campaigns. In conversation with
the authors, Mr. Petro indicated that in the mid-1980s when he received "soft" money con-
tributions at the Democratic National Committee, the party had a strong preference for
"hard" money, which could be used directly in campaigns. "Around 1986, I brought in a
check for $100,000 and was told that I should have brought four checks of $25,000 each.
The attitude there was that because only $25,000 from that check could go directly to
campaigns, the remaining $75,000 was relatively useless and would have to be used to pay
the rent and bills."
38. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(1994)) (banning corporate financial contributions to federal campaigns); Labor Manage-
ment Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1994)) (banning contributions from labor unions to fed-
eral campaigns).
39. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d. 468 (1st Cir. 1991).
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eral campaign finance laws and is not subject to funding limits.40
The extent to which "soft" money has become a problem is evident
merely by comparing the 1996 and 2000 election cycles. In the 1996 cy-
cle, the national party committees raised and spent more than $250 mil-
lion in unlimited "soft" money.41 In 1998 (a non-presidential election
year), the parties raised $201 million-a new record for a midterm elec-
tion.42 The Republicans raised 112% more than in 1994, while the
Democrats raised some 89% more.43 Much of this money comes in con-
tributions of $100,000 or more.44 At this stage in the 2000 election cycle,
the two major political parties have raised more than $250 million in
"soft" money, and the expectation is that the final 2000 figure will be
nearly twice the amount raised in 1996.46
A libertarian or ardent foe of government regulation might look at this
situation and wonder what the problem is with giving such large amounts
of money, especially if the dollars are disclosed in a timely manner.47
While prompt disclosure would certainly be important, the current situa-
tion allows individuals to end-run the $1000 limit while corporations and
labor unions are able to avoid the ban on their contributing to political
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-44. Early in the 2000 elections, "527 organizations" be-
came a favored vehicle for groups and individuals who wanted to support or oppose can-
didates without being constricted by any limits and without having to disclose anything
about themselves or their donors. The organizations are named after the section of the
Tax Code (26 U.S.C. § 527) that applies to them. Under this section of the Code, "politi-
cal organizations" are tax-exempt. 26 U.S.C. § 527(a) (1994). Before a recent change in
the law, these organizations did not have to disclose any information about themselves or
their donors. The new law dictates that these organizations that were previously exempt
from disclosure requirements must now disclose information about the organization, such
as the officers and expenditures, and must also disclose who its contributors are and how
much they gave. See Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 106-
230, § 2, 114 Stat. 477, 479 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 527).
41. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See John M. Broder & Don Van Natta, Jr., 12,000 to Pay Tribute to the Fund-
Raiser in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at Al; Don Van Natta, Jr., Republicans' Goal
is $1 Million Each From Top Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1999, at Al.
45. See Common Cause, National Parties Raise Record $256 Million in Soft Money
During First 18 Months of 1999-2000 Election Cycle (visited Sept. 5, 2000)
<http://www.commoncause.org/publications/j ulyOO/072500.htm>.
46. See Don Van Natta, Jr., As Political Gifts Set a Record Pace, Some Stop Giving,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at Al (reporting that the parties raised $262 million worth of
soft money in 1996 and projecting the 2000 figure as $500 million).
47. See George F. Will, Editorial, Free to Be Politically Intense, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 2000, at A27. For views supporting deregulation of the campaign finance system and
disclosure of contributions, visit the Cato Institute at <http://www.cato.org> and The Heri-
tage Foundation at <http://www.heritage.com>.
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candidates. As the CED report notes:
These unlimited funding devices give a relatively small group of
donors great influence in the electoral process. They facilitate
relationships between monied interests and candidates that in-
crease the possibility of corruption and undermine the account-
ability and transparency that safeguard against it. And they
threaten to place candidates and their campaign issues in the
shadow of intervening interest groups, whose unregulated ex-
penditures drive their own political agendas.48
The four problems discussed above suggest that there is no simple so-
lution or silver bullet to address the complexity of our broken campaign
financing system. As suggested above, merely deregulating the system to
allow for unlimited contributions from any individual (including corpora-
tions and labor unions), coupled with immediate public disclosure on the
Internet, solves some concerns, but raises others. For example, one con-
cern addresses whether a fund-raising "arms race"-in which the bar is
continually raised-is healthy. Likewise, the opposite extreme of elimi-
nating all individual, corporate, and labor money from campaigns and in-
stalling a taxpayer-subsidized, entirely publicly financed campaign sys-
tem will have consequences on candidate competitiveness as well as
regulatory and allocation issues.
Successful campaign finance reform must therefore balance several
competing considerations. There must be a balance between regulation
and First Amendment guarantees. 49 At the same time, the system must
encourage funding needed for robust political debate and competition
(especially by challengers) to curtail the undue influence of money. It is
important to reiterate that the CED Trustees and others who have en-
dorsed the CED report do not believe that money in politics is bad.
Conversely, when that money enters the system subject to appropriate,
effective limitations-be it from individuals, PACs, corporations, or la-
bor unions-it will encourage, rather than discourage, participation in
our democracy.
48. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
49. See id. Senator Mitch McConnell has often cited the First Amendment as a basis
for opposing campaign finance reform legislation. Senator McConnell's arguments have
been discussed and questioned in a paper issued by E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Executive Di-
rective, and Debra Goldberg, Senior Attorney, at New York University School of Law's
Brennan Center for Justice. See Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Mitch
McConnell's Myths About the Constitutional Limitations on Campaign Finance Reform
(visited Oct. 13, 2000) <http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/resources-actionpapers.
html>. Additionally, more than 125 legal scholars support the constitutionality of closing
the "soft" money loophole. See Letter from Professors Ronald Dworkin and Burt Neub-
orne (Sept. 27, 1997) (on file with the author).
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IV. THE CED REFORMS
The CED report includes four recommendations for changing our
campaign finance system. The recommendations focus on issues such as
"soft" money, the level of individual contributions, limited and matched
public funding, overall expenditure limits, legitimate party expenditures,
and reforming issue advocacy rules. Because of the complexity of the
campaign finance system, the CED report urges that these recommenda-
tions be considered as part of a package of reforms. In other words,
merely adopting one or two of the recommendations will fail to address
other critical-and often linked-issues.
A. Eliminate "Soft" Money
The CED report would eliminate all "soft" or unregulated money on
the premise that all dollars being used to support individual political
candidacies should be regulated dollars subject to the restrictions of fed-
eral campaign finance laws. The report urges that "[n]o reform is more
urgently needed than a ban on national party 'soft money' financing.',5
Although CED urges voluntary compliance with a "soft" money ban, it
also calls upon Congress to prohibit the raising or spending of "soft"
money by the national party committees as well as incumbents and chal-
lengers.5' Likewise, CED urges state legislatures to pass complementary
legislation so thatstate party committees cannot rely on unlimited or un-
disclosed funding sources. 2 Such a ban, if implemented, would end the
unlimited contributions from wealthy individuals as well as from corpo-
rations and labor unions, thereby effectively reinstating the 1907" and
194754 laws banning such contributions to political campaigns.
"Soft" money is raised essentially by the major political parties and the
related House and Senate campaign committees. Eliminating "soft"
money entirely would obviously have serious adverse consequences for
the parties and these committees. To compensate at least partially for
this loss, CED recommends changing the current rules that limit individ-
ual contributions to federal candidates and political committees. Today's
limit is an annual total of $25,000 for all contributions to federal candi-
50. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
51. See id. at 34.
52. See id. at 35.
53. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §
441(b)(1994)).
54. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1994)).
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dates, PACs, and party committees.55
CED would establish two separate aggregate individual limits. The
first limit would allow individuals to give up to $25,000 annually to fed-
eral candidates and PACs.56 The second limit would establish a separate
ceiling that would limit the aggregate amount contributed by an individ-
ual to national party committees to $25,000 annually.57 The net effect of
this change would mean more, not less, money coming from individuals
than is currently allowed under existing laws.
B. Improve Candidate Access to Resources
It would be naYve to ignore the fact that running an effective modern
political campaign requires adequate resources. Communication is
costly, especially if the medium employed is television. While campaign
costs have escalated, candidates for federal office have been required to
adhere to a ceiling of not more than $1000 from any individual contribu-
tor per election. The $1000 limit has been in effect since the federal elec-
tion law was enacted in 1974." To address this concern, the CED report
urges Congress to raise the limit on individual contributions from $1000
to $3000 per candidate per election.59 This limit would subsequently be
adjusted for inflation.
Although only a small minority of Americans makes political cam-
paign contributions, there is the perception that big money donors enjoy
special access.6" The goal of effective reform, according to the CED re-
port, should be to encourage broader participation in the campaign fi-
nance system of small dollar donors while simultaneously reducing the
political influence of wealthy donors.61 To address this consideration, the
CED report urges Congress to enact voluntary public funding for con-
gressional candidates on a two-to-one basis up to a maximum of $400 in
public funding for each individual contribution of up to $200.62 The
money for the public match would come from appropriated dollars, as
distinguished from the presidential "check-off" contribution that is op-
55. See supra note 13 (discussing current campaign contribution laws).
56. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 35.
57. See id.
58. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (1994).
59. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 36.
60. See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, Money & Politics Survey: A National
Survey of the Public's Views on How Money Impacts Our Political System (visited Sept. 17,
2000) <http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/survey/top.htm>.
61. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
62. Id. at 4-5.
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tional on the individual Form 1040 from the Internal Revenue Service.
For a federal candidate to be eligible to receive this match, the candidate
would have to agree to accept spending limits as well as limit any per-
sonal contribution to his or her own campaign to $25,000.3
If adopted, this proposal would have powerful consequences for the
way in which federal political campaigns are conducted. As the CED re-
port explains:
This reform will give candidates a strong incentive to solicit
small individual contributions and small contributors an incen-
tive to make them. It will significantly reduce the emphasis on
fundraising in federal campaigns because, with this amount of
matching funds, candidates will have an option of receiving a
majority of their campaign money from small contributions and
the matching public funds. Indeed, total individual contribu-
tions plus the matching funds would be sufficient to fully fi-
nance congressional campaign spending at current levels. Fi-
nally, this change will increase competition in federal elections
by substantially increasing the resources available to challeng-
64ers.
C. Reduce the Fundraising "Arms Race" with Congressional Spending
Limits
In exchange for the two-to-one publicly funded matching program de-
scribed above, federal candidates would be required to abide by a system
of campaign spending limits much like the case now in presidential elec-
tions. The CED report urges that such limits "be generous enough to in-
duce candidates to accept public financing, but stringent enough to re-
duce the growth of campaign spending.,
65
For U.S. House races, a candidate receiving public funding would be
allowed to spend up to $500,000 in a primary election and $500,000 in a
general election.66 In the event of a runoff election, an additional
$200,000 would be allowed.67 Additionally, these limits would be re-
viewed and adjusted for inflation at the outset of each election cycle.6M
The spending limits for U.S. Senate candidates receiving public fund-
ing would be equal to a base amount of $1 million plus 50V times the
63. See id. at 36-37.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
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voting-age population of the "state." In the event of a runoff election, an
additional amount equal to 20% of this limit would be allowed. 69 This
ceiling would likewise be adjusted for inflation. °
In both instances, any campaign expenses incurred for legal services,
accounting services, or legal-compliance expenses would be exempt from
the limits.' Also, candidates who face opponents who are not restrained
by the spending limits (i.e., opponents who finance their campaigns out
of their own pocketbooks) should be permitted to spend additional
amounts of money and receive additional public financing subsidies
equal to the amounts expended against them.72
Another provision of the CED recommendations in this area would
permit party committees to assist candidates by giving them financial as-
sistance up to the level of the spending limit for the particular candidate.
Political party organizations would be permitted to make coordinated
expenditures on behalf of a candidate to supplement a candidate's cam-
paign spending, so long as the total amount spent by the candidate and
the party does not exceed the set limit for the race.73 This would allow
for more coordination than is permitted under current campaign finance
laws.74
Such a system will necessarily entail effective federal regulation. Most
importantly, it will require vigilance by the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), a federal agency that has occasionally received public criticism
for its lack of timeliness and has often lacked the resources to carry out
its mission.75 To achieve the goal of a strengthened FEC, the CED report
urges Congress "to review the staffing, structure, and current funding of
the FEC and provide it with the resources and authority needed to en-







74. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994) (setting forth strict limitations on coordi-
nated expenditures, both in terms of how much can be spent and for what purposes).
75. See Karen Foerstel et al., Campaign Overhaul Mired in Money and Loopholes, 58
CONG. Q. WKLY. 1084, 1084 (2000). The authors quote Larry Makinson, Executive Di-
rector of the Center for Responsive Politics, in reference to the increasing amounts of un-
disclosed money flowing into campaigns, as saying that "[tihe Federal Election Commis-
sion is more useless than ever .... " Id.; see also Joshua Wolf Shenk, Designed for
Impotence: Why the Federal Election Commission Is a Lap Dog for the Political Class, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1997, at 30.
76. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 39.
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D. Reform Issue Advocacy
As noted, it is the combined effect of existing federal law and the Su-
preme Court's Buckley v. Valeo decision that allows circumvention of the
law and the use of "soft" money for what is effectively candidate-specific
advocacy.77 Existing federal campaign finance laws permit the regulation
of "express advocacy," which is defined by the so-called "magic words"
test. In short, express advocacy is advocacy that calls for electing or de-
feating an individual candidate. 78 The CED report considers this test to
be far too narrow.79 In fact, the explosion of "soft" money on the politi-
cal scene since the mid-1980s has been associated directly with this legal
loophole: most of the soft dollars raised are used by the parties to run
candidate-specific ads that masquerade as issue ads.
Any legal modification of the existing standard will face close judicial
scrutiny. The CED report recognizes this fact but nonetheless believes
that such an attempt is worth the effort. Accordingly, the CED report
urges Congress to establish clear criteria for identifying public communi-
cations that constitute express advocacy and to require that the financing
of such communications be subject to federal contribution limits.81 The
report also urges Congress to provide for timely public disclosure of the
sources of the funding and the amounts spent.
82
In grappling with an effective, workable definition of "express advo-
cacy" that simultaneously comports with the requirements of the First
Amendment, CED recommends that "express advocacy" include com-
munications that:
(1) refer to a clearly identified federal candidate, or feature the
image or likeness of a clearly identified federal candidate; (2)
occur within 30 days of a primary election and are targeted at
77. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
78. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976) (per curiam). Current law permits
"soft" money to be used by party organizers for so called "issue advocacy" as distin-
guished from "express advocacy," which endorses or opposes specific candidates. Under
the Buckley standard, the Supreme Court has narrowly defined "express advocacy" as ad-
vertisements which use words such as "vote for" or "vote against" particular candidates.
Id. at 448 & n.52. CED believes that the "magic words" test is too narrow and allows the
campaign finance laws to be easily circumvented. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 39. For
example, an advertisement can clearly support or oppose a specific candidate without us-
ing the "magic words." Id. at 39-40.
79. See CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 39.
80. See, e.g., George Lardner, Jr., Groups Allege Parties Using 'Soft Money' Illegally
on Ads, WASH. POST, June 22, 2000, at A2; Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The Sys-
tem Cracks Under the Weight of Cash, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al.
81. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 39.
82. Id.
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the state in which the primary is occurring, or within 60 days of
a general election; and (3) would be understood by a reasonable
person to be encouraging others to support or oppose that can-
didate .
Needless to say, this significant reform of the issue advocacy laws will
be vigorously contested in the federal courts. CED believes that its pro-
posed reforms will withstand First Amendment scrutiny.' In the event
that CED's broader standard for determining the scope of express advo-
cacy is not sustained by the courts, there should be prompt public disclo-
sure of the financing source of these activities.
V. THE REACTION TO THE CED REPORT
CED released the report on March 19, 1999 at a press release and
luncheon held in Washington, D.C. at which Congressman Christopher
Shays was the featured speaker. That afternoon, CNN featured a news
segment on the CED report on its AllPolitics.com website in which CNN
characterized the report as a "man bites a dog" story85 because, after all,
the corporate community is often the source of much of the "soft" money
86that is raised. Major national newspapers and magazines reported on
the CED study for many weeks following its release.87
It was, however, the intervention of a leading opponent of campaign
finance reform that brought the CED report even more widespread me-
dia attention. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) had emerged as a fierce
opponent of campaign reform in the Senate. On repeated occasions,
Senator McConnell effectively blocked consideration of legislation spon-
sored by Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.), and Senator Russell Feingold
(D-Wis.). 8 Using parliamentary tactics, Senator McConnell prevented
the U.S. Senate from even voting on the McCain-Feingold legislation.89
83. Id.
84. See Campaign Finance Reform: Citizen Participation: Hearings on Citizen Partici-
pation in the Political Process Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin., 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of E. Joshua Rosenkranz, President and CEO, Brennan Center for Jus-
tice) (supporting "issue advocacy" regulation against First Amendment arguments).
85. Jackson, supra note 19.
86. See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money by Sector, 1994-98 (visited
Aug. 28, 2000) http:l/www.opensecrets.org/pubs/whopaid/soft/bysector.htm (charting soft
money contributions by industry).
87. See, e.g., Jim Drinkard, Business Group: Ban 'Soft Money,' USA TODAY, Mar.
19, 1999, at 7A.
88. See David Espo, GOP Talks Reforms to Death: Filibuster Kills Campaign Finance
Bill, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 20,1999, at 34.
89. See id. (quoting Senator McConnell as saying that: "'The Senate did the country a
favor' by keeping the bill bottled up.").
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Perhaps not coincidentally, Senator McConnell also chaired the National
Republican Senatorial Committee, the organ of Republican Senators
dedicated to recruiting Republican candidates to run for the Senate as
well as raising "soft" money dollars to support these races around the
country.9
On May 27, 1999, using letterhead from the National Republican Sena-
torial Committee, Senator McConnell wrote to several CED Trustees
expressing his "concern" over their support for CED's campaign finance
reform recommendations. 9' Senator McConnell's letter conjectured that
CED improperly listed the names of several of its business leaders as
supporters of its reforms without their knowledge. 92 The Senator then
characterized the CED plan as one that would "deny corporations the
right to make perfectly legal non-federal contributions to political par-
ties; restrict the right of political parties to advocate positions on issues;
limit the free speech of candidates; and force taxpayers to subsidize po-
litical activities with which they may not agree." 93 Calling the CED plan
a strategy for "nothing less than unilateral disarmament," the Senator
concluded by stating that "I am certain that CED has invoked your name
in error, and to ensure that we quickly put this embarrassment to rest, I
would welcome any clarification you can provide.,
94
Senator McConnell never disclosed to whom he sent his letter, but
roughly two months later, he wrote again to several CED Trustees with a
much stronger and more pointed message.9 An advertisement which
appeared in The Hill magazine on July 21, 1999, urging Congress to enact
90. The National Republican Senatorial Committee is the Republican Committee
charged with raising funds to support Republican senatorial candidates around the coun-
try. The committee also raises funds to support these races and directs how the dollars
should be allocated among various races. Its Chairman is Senator Mitch McConnell (R-
Ky.), and its Executive Director is Stephen J. Law.
91. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell to select CED Trustees 1 (May 27, 1999)
(on file with Catholic University Law Review).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Senator McConnell addressed his letter to several CED Trustees who were
not on CED's Campaign Finance Reform Subcommittee or its Research and Policy Com-
mittee. All CED policy statements carry the following disclaimer: "Except for the mem-
bers of the Research and Policy Committee and the responsible subcommittee, the recom-
mendations presented herein are not necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others associated with CED." CED REPORT, su-
pra note 15, at iv. Accordingly, some of the individuals to whom the Senator wrote had
neither participated in the subcommittee's deliberations nor endorsed the recommenda-
tions.
95. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell to CED Trustees I (July 28, 1999) (on file
with Catholic University Law Review).
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campaign finance reform legislation, prompted Senator McConnell to
write this second letter.96 CED was a signatory to the advertisement,
along with other organizations such as the Sierra Club, the League of
Women Voters, Common Cause, Pirg, Campaign for America, AARP,
and Public Citizen & Public Campaign.
Senator McConnell characterized the signatories' position as one "that
would ban corporate political activism and render the Republican Party
powerless to defend pro-business candidates from negative TV attacks
by labor unions, trial lawyers and radical environmentalists."" The pe-
nultimate paragraph stated that: "If you disagree with the radical cam-
paign finance agenda of the Committee for Economic Development and
resent its abuse of your company's reputation, I would think that public
withdrawal from this organization would be a reasonable response."98
And then, in his own handwriting, Senator McConnell wrote across the
bottom of each letter, "I hope [your company] will resign from CED."99
Whether Senator McConnell's actions are appropriate for a U.S. Sena-
tor is a question for the relevant Senate oversight body. From a com-
monsense perspective, however, there can be no doubt that the Senator's
message was one of intimidation-a veiled threat with an underlying in
terrorem message to the effect that "if you keep playing with them, I
won't play with you." For companies with interests before the Congress,
such a message was tantamount to saying that you would no longer enjoy
access to certain lawmakers.
Roughly one month later, the New York Times learned of the McCon-
nell letter to CED, and it blasted the Senator's tactics with a lead edito-
rial on Sunday, August 29, 1999 entitled 'Thuggish' Tactics in Congress.t",
The Times editorial explained that "[t]he inference drawn [from the
McConnell letter] by some donors is that if they do not behave, Republi-
cans will not fight for their interests."' ' The editorial further noted that
"[t]he idea that campaign reform is some sort of plot against Republicans
is absurd." ' The Times then quoted the CED response to the Senator,
which stated that "we find it ironic that you are such a fervent defender
of the First Amendment freedoms but seem intent to stifle our efforts to
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many feel is out of control."' 3 Although some defenders of the current
campaign finance system see the principal issue as freedom of speech,
others seeking reform are concerned about what might be perceived as
corruption, extortion, or just simply a shakedown for money.
Senator McConnell's tactics had precisely the opposite effect of what
he intended. Rather than lose members of its Board of Trustees, CED
actually recruited additional Trustees who signed on because of CED's
position on campaign finance reform. The organization also continued
its effort to enlist additional endorsers from corporate America. More
than one half of its board endorsed the recommendations, and using that
network, by late 1999, more than 250 individuals had publicly endorsed
CED's recommendations. Finally, the organization continued to receive
favorable press and editorial commentary from around the country."
15
In early October 1999, Congress again considered campaign finance re-
form legislation in the form of the McCain-Feingold bill. t The House of
Representatives passed similar legislation on September 14, 1999, and
the legislation was pending before the Senate with a vote expected on
October 19, 1999. On October 6, 1999, CED sponsored a luncheon in
Washington, D.C. to coincide with the Senate's deliberations at which
Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold were the featured speakers.
Senator Feingold noted, during his remarks, the work CED had under-
taken to promote serious campaign finance reform and stated that "when
the history of [campaign finance reform] is written .... it will be the CED
response to Mitch McConnell that will have won the day.""7 Later that
week, the Senate failed to enact the McCain-Feingold legislation, but the
congressional champions of campaign finance reform in both parties
vowed to continue their efforts to enact legislation.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S12601 (daily ed. Oct. 14,1999) (statement of Sen. John
McCain). Senator McCain has made the case that the large amounts of soft money pour-
ing into campaigns have corrupted the legislative process.
"Those [special interests who give large amounts of soft money] enjoy greater in-
fluence here than the working men and women who cannot buy our attention but
are sometimes affected adversely by the laws we pass. To me that seems to be a
good working definition of the impairment of our integrity which, as I noted, is
Webster's definition of 'corruption."'
Id.; see also Edward A. Kangas, Editorial, Ending the Shakedown, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
2000, at A17.
105. See, e.g., Editorial, The Campaign Shakedown, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 2, 1999,
at 10; Editorial, Rebels in Suits, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 2, 1999, at 10A.
106. SeeS. 1593, 106th Cong. (1999).
107. Senator Russell Feingold, Address at the CED Luncheon on Campaign Finance
Reform 2 (Oct. 6, 1999) (transcript on file with Catholic University Law Review).
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Congress did enact, however, a modest campaign finance reform pro-
posal in July 2000. In response to the widely documented abuse created
by proliferating "Section 527 organizations,"10 8 both houses of Congress
swiftly enacted legislation to curb the use by third-party organizations of
so-called independent expenditures as ways to provide candidate-specific
advertising." 9 President Clinton signed this legislation on July 1, 2000. "0
VI. CONCLUSION
Although campaign finance reform legislation at the federal level has
been stalled in recent years, there have been significant reforms at the
state and even local levels."' CED's effort to engage the American busi-
ness community in supporting reform has resulted in a growing number
of endorsements as well as additional major corporations announcing
that they are ceasing to give "soft" money contributions to the two major
political parties."
2
The CED report makes it clear that the endorsing business leaders are
not opposed to money in politics."3 In fact, were the CED recommenda-
tions to be enacted today, there would probably be more, not less, money
in American politics. The issue, of course, is how that money is raised.
Additionally, unlike some other single-issue reform groups, CED does
not favor full public financing, but rather the two-to-one partial public
funding described above."4 The CED reforms would ensure that ade-
quate funding is provided to the political parties: individuals would be
able to contribute up to $25,000 per election cycle to political parties, an
amount in addition to the proposed aggregate $25,000 cap in the CED
proposal."5 There is a consensus among the CED endorsers that strong,
108. 146 CONG. REC. S7590 (daily ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Senator Fiengold);
John McCain, McCain Vows to Continue to Push for Votes on Campaign Finance Reform
(visited Aug. 28, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-mccainlcfrclose.htm>.
109. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, Hiding the Money, 32 NAT'L J. 2154, 2155 (2000);
Ruth Marcus, Flood of Secret Money Erodes Election Limits, WASH. POST, May 15, 2000,
at Al.
110. See generally Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 106-
230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000).
111. See generally, e.g., New York City, N.Y. Local Law No. 8 (Feb. 29, 1988) (estab-
lishing the New York City Campaign Finance Program); Maine Clear Election Act, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (West 2000). The people of Maine approved the
law via the November 1996 Maine Ballot, and it is in effect for the first time this election
year.
112. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 46, at Al.
113. CED REPORT, supra note 15, at 1-2.
114. See id. at 36.
115. See id. at 35.
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well-financed political parties strengthen, rather than weaken, our demo-
cratic political institutions.
The advent of CED in the campaign finance reform debate raises the
question of why businesses give "soft" money in the first place. The fact
that "soft" money contributions are expected to double in the 2000 elec-
tion cycle suggests that at least some in business believe that the money
is a good investment, but an investment in what? "Soft" money contri-
butions go directly to the political parties and reflect amounts that are
over and above whatever lobbying expenses a company may undertake.
Thus, it is quite likely that the only plausible explanation for "soft"
money contributions is that they ensure access. This explanation, how-
ever, is one which virtually no "soft" money providers are willing to
make on the record.
In a rare moment of candor, however, one Fortune 500 Washington,
D.C. lobbyist admitted to National Journal reporter Burt Solomon that
some companies give "soft" money: "'Basically, [for] protection. . . .' If
you decline to give, you're taking a risk of legislative retribution ...
Companies are scared that on some critical issue, they'll get hosed. It'll
happen quickly, in the dead of night.""'1 " This statement speaks for itself
and makes clear what Senator McConnell intended to convey in his
handwritten note to several CED trustees. This lobbyist's frankness is to
be applauded, notwithstanding that the explanation presents a sad com-
mentary on the current state of our political system. In a country where
our elected representatives serve the people, it is troublesome when
there is a perception that access to our representatives depends on the
willingness of individuals, companies, and labor unions to ante up cam-
paign contributions.
The bipartisan calls for campaign finance reform are growing,"7 and we
can expect them to continue unabated until the politicians finally under-
stand that the people are, indeed, serious about changing the way money
enters our political system. The fact that a growing number of business
leaders and university presidents are challenging the system and urging
116. Burt Solomon, Forever Unclean, 32 NAT'LJ. 858, 863 (2000).
117 See, e.g., Committee for Economic Development, Endorsers of the CED Campaign
Finance Reform Proposal (visited Oct. 11, 2000) <http//www.ced.org/projects/
endorsers.htm>. CED now has 244 endorsers of its reform recommendations. See id.
Many of the endorsers are CEOs of leading corporations as well as university presidents.
See id.; see also Viveca Novak, Dialing Back the Dollars, TIME, Sept. 6, 1999, at 42-44. (re-
porting on Congress's attempt to reform campaign finance); Editorial, Revolt of the Busi-
ness Class, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2000, at A26 (discussing the "recent rebellion" among
wealthy businesses tired of being hit up by Democrats and Republicans for campaign do-
nations).
[Vol. 50:87
20001 Campaign Finance Reform: A Business Perspective 109
reform is a new and important development. As more and more suppli-
ers of "soft" money abandon their current practices, the momentum for
reform will continue to grow. CED is proud to be a leader in that effort.
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